


Higher Education and Africa's Development Agenda



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PREFACE

The Nyerere Resource Centre (NRC) runs two series of publications - Occasional Papers and Nyerere Dialogue Lectures. So far four Occasional Papers and one Nyerere Dialogue Lecture have been published. All the Lectures aim to advance the discourse around Mwalimu Nyerere's political thought and practice. Our first Dialogue Lecture by Professor Adebayo Olukoshi in 2015, is yet to be published. The second Lecture by Dr. Ng'wanza Kamata examined the development of Nyerere's Pan-Africanism from his nationalism. This, the third Lecture by Professor Paul Zeleza, follows on the heels of our Occasional Paper 4, which republished a number of essays by the late Professor Chachage which pointedly addressed the marginalisation of basic research in our universities. As Zeleza astutely traces the development of higher education in Africa and globally in its various dimensions, he articulates the major concern of most educationists, which is the commercialisation, vocationalisation, disarticulation and direct or indirect privatisation of higher education, particularly university education (*#thatcherisationofeducation!*).

These tendencies manifest themselves even more starkly in Africa where the massification of university education has gone hand in hand with the decline in its quality. While public universities have been starved of resources, the rash of private universities has managed to capture a sizeable portion of public money through student loans. A consultancy culture has gripped professors and other senior faculty, while junior faculty (usually from public universities) take on multiple teaching assignments in several universities (usually private universities), giving rise to what we in Tanzania call "flying lecturers". Both these practices have had a massive impact on basic research, teaching and learning in our universities, contributing in no small measure to the fall in education standards.

As African governments are forced to balance their budgets by erstwhile international financial institutions, the first victim claimed is the education sector. An immediate consequence is an increase in the fees. The hashtagged clarion call “#feesmustfall” by South African students dramatically expressed the all-round crisis of higher education in Africa which feeds into the underdevelopment of human capacity. The sharks of the “aid” industry are thus provided with an excuse to extend loans which further ensnare us in a world-wide-web of debt slavery.

This vicious circle has to be broken because the education crisis is not an isolated phenomenon. It is part of the global crisis of financial capitalism that has engulfed the world for the last three decades. It needs to be explained within this wider context. There is no more opportune moment to do this than now, and no better persons to do it than us, the intellectuals. As the world stands poised at the crossroads of “emancipation or annihilation”, Africa is crying out for a new wave of liberation.

Issa Shivji
Director, NRC
November 2016

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Introduction

I am very pleased to give this lecture, named after the towering and incomparable statesman and Pan-Africanist, Julius Nyerere, the founder President of Tanzania. President Nyerere was one of Africa's few philosopher-kings, whose profound thoughts on the historic and humanistic agenda of African nationalism, namely, decolonisation, development, democratisation, nation-building and regional integration remain as compelling as ever.

In this lecture, I seek to explore the intertwined topics of the challenges facing African higher education and the prospects for sustainable development. Across the continent, both universities and development are undergoing complex and contradictory changes that reinforce and reproduce social inequalities. These threaten the humanistic and historic dreams of the nationalist and pan-Africanist project for self-determination, democratisation, development, nation-building, and regional integration. As it happens, my last two books deal with these issues in greater depth.¹

I begin by looking at the changing contexts of African development, in which the transformations in the higher education sector and the sector's contributions can productively be located. In this regard, I interrogate the narrative of Africa rising, its manifestations and key dynamics. This is followed by an examination of the major changes taking place in African higher education, part and parcel of the broad shifts taking place around the world. I conclude by trying to link the two, suggesting some of the ways in which higher education and the development project can be mutually reinforcing in the construction of inclusive, integrated, innovative and sustainable democratic developmental states and societies on our beloved continent.

Contemporary African Development

Narratives of Africa Rising/Rising Africa

In examining contemporary trends in African growth and development it is perhaps appropriate to preface the analysis by noting the marked shift from the Afropessimism of the 1980s and 1990s to the current flush of Afroptimism verging on Afro-euphoria embodied in the narrative of Africa rising/rising Africa. Let me hasten to add that both imageries are dangerously simplistic. One is based on the pathological denigration of Africa so deeply rooted in Western imagination and colonial discourse, the other invokes fantasies of merry Africa beloved in uncritical Afrocentric celebration of African pasts and futures.

The Africa rising narrative is propagated by the media, international consulting firms, and international financial institutions. The swing from Afropessimism to Afroptimism is best captured in *The Economist* magazine. In the issue of May 11, 2000, it published a cover story entitled, “The Hopeless Continent,” which enraged African opinion. In the issue of October 9, 2008, it revised that harsh indictment with a lead article entitled, “There is Hope.” Then in a cover story of December 3, 2011, it repented and proclaimed, “Africa Rising.” This narrative has been repeated in other economic magazines, such as *African Business*, and the general media in Africa and elsewhere.

Emblematic of the discovery of ‘Africa rising’ by the international management consulting firms is the 2010 report from McKinsey and Company, titled *Lions on the move: The progress and potential of African economies*. The report enthused, “Africa’s economic pulse has quickened, infusing the continent with a new commercial vibrancy. Real GDP rose 4.9% per year from 2000 through 2008, more than twice its pace in the 1980s and ‘90s. Telecom, banking, and retail are flourishing. Construction is booming. Foreign investment is surging.”² In September 2016, Mckinsey revisited Africa’s trajectory in *Lions on the move II: Realising the potential of Africa’s economies* and reaffirmed “the continent’s fundamentals remain strong.” Although the report noted growth paths within the continent will continue to diverge, it maintained “Africa as a whole is projected by the International Monetary Fund to be

the world's second-fastest-growing economy to 2020.”³

This narrative found succour in the weighty reports and conferences of the international financial institutions - the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the African Development Bank. In the words of one World Bank Report, “perceptions of Africa changed dramatically over the past 20 years. Viewed as a continent of wars, famines, and entrenched poverty in the late 1990s, there is now a focus on ‘Africa rising’ and an ‘African 21st century.’ At 4.5 percent a year, average economic growth was remarkably robust, especially when contrasted with the continuous decline during the 1970s and 1980s.”⁴ Among the jamboree of conferences one can point to the much hyped meeting organised in May, 2014 by the International Monetary Fund on “Africa Rising: Building the Future.”⁵ For its part, the African Development Bank presented bullish reports on Africa’s prospects even as growth rates declined from 2010 from their highs of the previous decade.⁶

Critics questioned the durability of Africa’s growth, its translation into sustainable development, and especially its impact on inequality and poverty reduction. The African Progress Panel Report 2012 was unequivocal in its grim judgement. It noted “Africa’s economies are consistently growing faster than those of almost any other region – and at twice the rate of the 1990s.... Yet there is another side to the balance sheet. Countries across Africa are becoming richer but whole sections of society are being left behind. After a decade of buoyant growth, almost half of Africans still live on less than \$1.25 a day. Wealth disparities are increasingly visible. The current pattern of trickle-down growth is leaving too many people in poverty, too many children hungry and too many young people without jobs. Unequal access to health, education, water and sanitation is reinforcing wider inequalities.”⁷

A survey by Afrobarometer seemed to confirm “widespread dissatisfaction with current economic conditions despite a decade of strong growth. Africans overwhelmingly reject their governments’ management of their economies, giving failing marks for job creation, improving the living standards of the poor, and narrowing the gaps between the rich and poor. Economic growth appears to benefit only a few.... Popular opinion is thus increasingly out

of sync with the ‘Africa Rising’ narrative that has been gaining traction among government officials and international investors.”⁸ The World Bank conceded that while “the share of people living on less than \$1.90 a day (in 2011 international purchasing power parity [PPP]) fell from 57 percent in 1990 to 43 percent in 2012... the number of poor still increased by more than 100 million (from 288 to 389 million)” because of population growth.⁹

My argument in my book on *Africa’s Resurgence* is that we should avoid the rhetoric of Afro-pessimism and Afroptimism, let alone Afro-euphoria, and examine, soberly and critically, the complex and contradictory changes the continent is undergoing. I focus on the processes of domestic, global, and diaspora transformations whose trajectory is as multidimensional as it is unpredictable. Following a brief recap of these processes in the next section, I will provide a broad assessment of the continuing disjuncture between growth and development.

Manifestations of the Resurgence

In the literature, among the various indices used to capture Africa’s resurgence, four tend to stand out. First, it is often pointed out that since 2000 Africa has been growing faster than other world regions except Asia and has enjoyed rates of growth reminiscent of the post-independence decade of the 1960s. Between 2000 and 2010 real annual GDP growth was 5.4%. While this slowed to 3.3% between 2010 and 2015 it compared favourably to other world regions. Growth continued despite the global financial crisis and decline in commodity prices.

Second, Africa’s growth is more broad-based and increasingly less dependent on primary commodities. The contribution of resources was minus 4% between 2010 and 2014, compared to 12% during the previous decade. Services, including transportation and finance, contributed 48% of GDP compared to 44% a decade earlier. Industry raised its share from 17% to 23%, much of it in construction and utilities, while manufacturing grew much slower at 4.3% between 2010 and 2014.

Third, before 2000 almost all Foreign Direct Investment went to resource-rich African economies. Now resource-poor economies outpace the latter when investment is measured as a share of GDP. Foreign investors from other African countries are especially keen on non-commodity industries: nearly a third of their investments are in financial services. Overall, FDI rose from \$14 billion in 2004 to \$73 billion in 2014.

Finally, the number of African countries classified as middle income increased from 13 in 2006 to 21 in 2013, and 10 more countries are expected to attain this status by 2025 on current trends. The size of the middle class in many countries has also grown, as will be demonstrated below.

The Dynamics of Africa's Growth

In *Africa's Resurgence*, I attribute Africa's growth to three broad sets of factors: domestic transformations across the continent, the restructuring of Africa's global engagements, and its deepening engagements with its diaspora. Each of these can of course be further unpacked. The domestic transformations encompass the expansion of intra-African economic engagements, socioeconomic changes, processes of democratisation, and the shifting dynamics of conflicts. As for the restructuring of Africa's global engagements this is marked by Africa's changing relations with the major economic powers of the Global North and growing engagements with the emerging economies including the BRICS. The continent's deepening engagements with its diaspora is evident in various ways from the discursive to the flows of demographic, economic, political, social, cultural, and even digital interconnections.

Domestic Transformations

As far as the expansion of intra-African engagements is concerned, one can single out the growth in trade and investment. Impediments to intra-African trade are well-known. It remains low compared to other world regions, due

to such factors as “lack of product diversification, low trade complementarity among African countries and high trade costs,” as well as “poor transport and communications infrastructure and unreliable power,” and “a lack of trade facilitation instruments, including trade finance, and complex customs arrangements.”¹⁰

Despite these impediments, progress is discernible. According to the African Development Bank, “In 2000, intra-regional trade accounted for 10% of Africa’s total trade. In 2014, it was 16%. This trade is mainly in manufactured goods, which are less susceptible to price shocks. Manufactured products account for 60% of total regional trade.”¹¹ Talking of the sub-Saharan region alone, the AfDB notes that “Intra-African exports increased more than four times between 2001 and 2008, from \$11.8 to \$ 47.7 billion. In fact, [the region] registered the fastest growth of intra-regional trade among all the world regions.”¹²

The growth of intra-African investment has also been remarkable. To quote a report by Ernest & Young, “African investors nearly tripled their share of FDI projects over the last decade, from 8.0% in 2003 to 22.8% in 2013. The rate of intra-African investment expanded even faster in value, growing from a share of 4.4% in 2003 to 22.3% in 2013. Intra-African investment has also driven job creation on the continent. It is now the second largest source of jobs behind Western Europe, jumping from fourth position in 2012. This growth is fuelled by the need for improved regional value chains and strengthening regional integration.”¹³ South Africa is the most active intra-African investor, followed by Morocco, Kenya, and Nigeria.

Among the socio-economic changes, the most critical include the rising rates of population growth, urbanisation, and middle class formation. Africa had a population of 1.1 billion people in 2013, which constituted 15.5% of the world’s population. On current trends this is projected to grow to 2.4 billion by 2050, or 25.1% of the world’s population, and 4 billion by 2100, which will represent 40% of the world’s population. In an aging world, especially in the Global North, many see this as a favourable long-term fundamental. Whether this will be a developmental boon or a Malthusian

nightmare for the continent will depend on the rate and patterns of Africa's growth and development over the next few decades. Developing inclusive quality education is imperative for the continent to yield the demographic dividend of its bulging population.

African cities are growing at breakneck speed, at 3.6% annually, double the world average. Currently Africa's urbanisation stands at about 40%, and it is expected to exceed 50% by 2030, by which time the continent will cease to be predominantly rural, rising to 60% by 2050. Some cities are expected to swell by up to 85% of their current size.¹⁴ Africa's major cities are emerging as hotspots of investment, consumption, and growth. But in most African cities infrastructure and services have lagged behind the rapid rates of urbanisation so that more than half of urban residents often live in slums.¹⁵ Thus, whether Africa's cities become transformative engines of development, or cesspools of squalor, will also depend on the rates of economic growth, patterns of development, and structural transformation in the processes of urbanisation.

Another remarkable development has been the growth of the middle classes. In its report *The Middle of the Pyramid: Dynamics of the Middle Class in Africa*, the African Development Bank estimated that 34% of the African population in 2010 was middle class, and projected in another report, *Africa in 50 Years' Time: The Road Towards Inclusive Growth*, that the middle class will reach 42% or 1.1 billion people in 2050. Deloitte estimates that the size of the African middle class has tripled over the last 30 years.¹⁶ Others have been more sceptical, positing that the middle class is much smaller than such rosy scenarios would have us believe.¹⁷ The fierce debates reflect divergent definitions of what constitutes the middle class and projections of its growth trajectory. However, there is no denying that more and more people across Africa are coming to have consumer power and appetites that are unprecedented.

Also notable has been the spread of democracy and development of more vocal civil societies and social movements across the continent. In the 1980s, most African states were dictatorships, either civilian or military. From the 1990s, many African countries began to introduce political reforms, thanks

to widespread struggles for the “second independence”, which rode on the backs of a global democratic wave following the demise of apartheid in South Africa and socialism in Central and Eastern Europe. In the 2000s many African countries had become either democratic or were in the process of becoming so, although the modalities of transition varied, as did the content and sustainability of the new democratic regimes. Indeed, democratisation and democratic consolidation continue to be beset by setbacks, reversals, and chicaneries of Africa’s dictators and political classes wedded to authoritarianism. Nonetheless, democratic spaces, expectations, and processes have expanded.

Finally, the continent has benefitted from a notable reduction of the debilitating wars and conflicts that afflicted it in the 1980s and 1990s. During the second half of the 20th century, Africa was embroiled in five types of wars - imperial, anti-colonial, intra-state, inter-state, and international wars. □ At the beginning of the 21st century, the first two sets of wars had disappeared, the next two had diminished significantly, and the final was escalating through terrorism, which has become a growing threat in northern, western, and eastern Africa. These changes provided opportunities to redirect resources from conflicts and wars and the massive devastations of physical and social infrastructures they engender and create more propitious conditions for development.

Restructuring of Africa’s Global Engagements

To fully understand the restructuring of Africa’s global engagement one has to examine the profound changes taking place in the global political economy. These transformations have become more evident in the last few decades, but their roots lie in shifts in the international division of labour going back several decades. Unfortunately, space does not allow for a detailed analysis of the unfolding of this complex historical process that should at the very least be traced to World War II.

Among the significant shifts that have taken place in the world economy since 2000, two in particular stand out. The first is the declining dominance of the economies of the Global North that was accelerated by the “Great

Recession” of 2008-09. The second was the growing importance of the emerging economies as represented by the rise of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey), and other popular configurations of economies in the Global South.

It can be argued that Africa’s globalisation as represented by the expanding and shifting range and dynamics of relations with the Global North and emerging economies is one of the major developments of the 21st century, although serious questions remain about the contribution to sustainable development of the current forms of integration of many African countries into the global economy. The United States, the European Union and Japan constitute Africa’s foremost economic partners in the Global North, while the BRICS are among the leading emerging economies.

By 2012 the European Union remained Africa’s largest trading partner. Two-way trade between Africa and the EU stood at \$240 billion, representing 38.2% of Africa’s total trade, followed by Africa-China trade which was worth \$198.5 billion, and U.S.-Africa trade at \$108.9 billion. Africa’s relationship with the European Union is exceptionally complex because of the histories and legacies of slavery, colonialism, and neo-colonialism. It is also fragmented because it encompasses a broad range of actors and contexts, policies and partnerships, and a series of overlapping bilateral, multilateral, and continental dialogues.

Africa and the U.S. enjoy a long relationship going back to the history of the Atlantic slave trade. By 2012, the United States claimed the largest stock of FDI in Africa totalling \$61.4 billion, followed by the United Kingdom with \$58.9 billion, and France with \$57.9 billion. When it comes to trade, by 2012 the U.S. had fallen into third place behind the European Union and China. Over the past fifty years, U.S. Africa policy has largely been framed through the prism of two humanitarian and militarisation paradigms. The first is the perspective of Africa as a zone of humanitarian disasters in need of constant social welfare assistance and interventions. The second is the militarisation of US policy shifting from anti-communism during the Cold War to “war on terror” in the 2000s.

Before China captured the world's imagination, there was Japan, the first major economic power to emerge from the non-western world in the 20th century. Japan's multiple representations in Africa came to be reflected in the organisation of Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), which was conceived as a forum to promote high-level policy dialogue between African and Asian leaders and their partners. TICAD reflected the rise of a more assertive Japan, which in 1989 had become the world's largest provider of official development assistance (ODA), overtaking the United States. Between 1991 and 2000 Japan accounted for 20% of all aid given by what are called the development assistance countries (DACs). In 2015 Japan's total trade with Africa reached \$24 billion, while its investment was \$14 billion (down from \$17 billion in 2014).

Since the 1990s the emerging economies have been growing much faster than the developed countries so that their share and importance in the global economy have risen while those of the Northern economies including the U.S. and EU have fallen, signalling, according to some economic historians, a historic shift in the direction of the world economy. This growth has slowed significantly for all BRICS, but the emerging economies as a whole continue to grow and increase their share of the world economy.

Generally, the emerging markets largely were not hit as hard by the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 as the Northern economies suggesting, in the view of some scholars, a decoupling in their growth trajectories. Growing interaction between the emerging markets is a major factor in their economic expansion. This is clearly evident for Africa, whose growth has become less dependent on the Northern economies and increasingly driven by relations with the other emerging economies. For example, Africa-China trade grew from \$2.4 billion in 1992 to about \$10 billion in 2000 and \$128.5b in 2010, hitting almost \$300 billion in 2015. China overtook the US as Africa's largest single trading partner in 2009. In a similar trend, Africa-India trade rose from \$1 billion in 1990, to \$3 billion in 2000, \$35 billion in 2008-9 and \$75-90 billion in 2015. Total trade between Brazil and Africa increased from about \$4.3 billion in 2000 to

\$20 billion in 2010 and \$28.5 billion in 2013.

China, India and Brazil are members of BRICS. Altogether BRICS accounts for 40% of the world population and 25% of the world's land mass. Their relative share of global GDP increased 3.6 times between 1990 and 2012, when they accounted for 56% of world GDP growth. By 2012 BRICS claimed about 20% of world GDP compared to 24% for the EU and 21% for the United States, and 43% of world reserves of foreign exchange. BRICS increased their share of total world trade to 21.3% as compared to 25% for the EU, and 27% for the US.

Africa's growing engagement has carried both benefits and pitfalls for the continent. Four key benefits can be underlined. First, these "emerging partners" have presented Africa enhanced opportunities for trade and investment. Second, they have offered higher commodity prices and enhanced competition for African resources. Third, BRICS has invested heavily in African infrastructure and industry, areas shunned by the Global North. Finally, it has forced the major economic powers, including the EU, Japan, and the US, to rethink their engagement with Africa. As for pitfalls, four can also be stressed. First, they present a threat of reversal of democratic governance and human rights gains as some BRICS are authoritarian states. Second, there is a danger of undermining African environmental, labour and safety standards. Third, there is a risk of mortgaging the future through selling short Africa's natural resources by corrupt officials. Finally, there is little evidence thus far that BRICS has assisted in integrating African economies into global value chains.

Africa's Deepening Engagement with the Diaspora

There is growing recognition in development discourse, engendered by the changing dynamics of diaspora engagements, of the importance of diasporas. Diaspora relations with their homelands are often complex, contradictory, and always changing so that it is hard to make generalisations about the behaviour and activities of any particular diaspora. Diaspora communities,

like all communities, are highly differentiated according to the social inscriptions of gender, class, ethnicity, religion, and ideology. Historically, the African diasporas played a fundamental role in the development of Pan-Africanism through which various continental nationalisms were incubated and developed. One can distinguish six versions of Pan-Africanism marked by complex intersections - Trans-Atlantic, Black Atlantic, continental, sub-Saharan, Pan-Arab, and global. Contemporary diaspora engagements with Africa include demographic, economic, political, cultural, social, iconographic, and digital flows.

In examining diaspora contributions to the development of their countries of origin, it is evident that this involves a variety of political, economic, social, and cultural activities channelled through formal and informal networks in the homeland, hostland, and the international system. Diaspora contributions to development can be both direct and indirect and undertaken by individuals and groups located in the hostland, homeland, or organised through transnational networks. Diasporas are motivated by voluntary as well as profit considerations. While individual activities are important, especially for remittances, diaspora engagements are most efficacious through collective organisation. Diaspora organisations can include hometown, ethnic, alumni, religious, or professional associations. They can also include development NGOs, investment/business groups, national development groups, welfare/refugee groups, supplementary schools, and virtual organisations.

Clearly, the question of diaspora and development involves three interconnected dynamics - development *in* the diaspora, development *through* the diaspora, and development *by* the diaspora. Not only have diasporas become more conscious of their power and potential, but interest in their role has increased among governments in both the sending and receiving countries, and international organisations from the UN and its various agencies to the World Bank and the International Organisation for Migration.

The inclusion by host governments, humanitarian organisations, and international agencies of migrants and diasporas in development efforts in their homelands is sometimes referred to as co-development. The reasons

for this growing interest in diaspora contributions to development relate to five Rs - remittances, return, resources, recognition, and reputation. The volume of remittances often exceeds official development assistance. Return migration whether temporary, permanent, or circulatory turns “brain drain” into “brain gain” and “brain circulation.” Diasporas possess multifaceted resources that need to be better mobilised and deployed. Diasporas tend to display dual loyalties to their countries of origin and settlement, and engaging them effectively has reputational benefits for all involved.

It is increasingly appreciated that engaging and mainstreaming diasporas in development work effectively involves several strategies first, through knowledge-building activities that include research, mapping exercises and pilot projects; second, strengthening diaspora technical and organisational capacities through training and knowledge exchange programmes and networking initiatives; third, supporting the organic formation of, rather than imposing, umbrella diaspora organisations; fourth, maximising diaspora participation in terms of partnership selection procedures, funding schemes, and forging equal not paternalistic or token collaborations in project development and implementation; and finally, actively including diasporas by recruiting diaspora individuals in development agencies, which brings diversity, and developing formal consultation processes with diaspora associations. The diversity that diasporas bring fosters innovation in often homogeneous development agencies and practices.

Thus previously negative views of diasporas and development - of the developmental impact of migration - have been tempered by appreciation of its benefits, although a lot remains to be done to improve understanding of these processes, promote policy coherence and coordination, and international dialogue and cooperation. Because of the evident economic and political clout of many diasporas, governments are increasingly courting them by creating agencies and even ministries for diasporic affairs. The growing recognition of the diaspora as part of the domestic political community is concretely manifested by conferring upon them dual citizenship and all the rights that this might entail including voting rights and political representation in state

parliaments, as well as preferential investment options and other economic and social privileges accorded to resident national citizens. According to one survey, by 2007 there were 115 states and independent territories that allowed citizens abroad to vote in domestic elections.

By 2010, 15 African countries had set up diaspora-related institutions and ministries in order to deal more professionally with diaspora-led development-related initiatives. Several African countries currently allow dual citizenship. They include Egypt, South Africa and Ghana. In 2004 the African Union recognised the diaspora as Africa's sixth region, although this has yet to be fully translated into the formal structures of the AU. The formal recognition and incorporation of the diaspora in homeland affairs allows the diaspora to increase its claims and influence.

There is a growing literature on the different aspects of diaspora engagements with Africa. Politically diasporas can exert significant influence, both positive and negative, on both their countries of origin and residence, and international institutions like the UN through protest, public relations campaigns, and diplomatic pressure. For example, in the United States the anti-apartheid struggle was heavily supported by diaspora mobilisation led by Tans-Africa that succeeded in getting Congress to override President Reagan's veto against imposing sanctions against South Africa. No less critical are the social and cultural dimensions of diaspora engagements. Diasporas acquire and possess social and cultural capital - attributes and attitudes, skills and sensibilities - that can be mobilised for the development of their countries of origin. Increasingly African governments and the diasporans themselves are mobilising this social and cultural capital. As for digital diasporisation, the Internet and social media have become powerful spaces for dynamic diaspora connections, negotiations, and inventions of transnational identities. Nollywood, one can argue, largely consumed through digital media in the diaspora, has done more to bring Africa alive and normalise it among the diaspora than generations of political exhortations about pan-Africanism ever achieved.

Much of the literature on diaspora engagements focuses on the economic

contributions from the diaspora which include remittances, philanthropy, human capital, and investment. From 2000 to 2007 remittance flows to the continent increased by more than 141 percent. In 2010, remittances sent by the 31 million international African migrants reached nearly \$40 billion, equivalent to 2.6 percent of Africa's GDP. This climbed to \$66 billion in 2014, led by Nigeria (\$20.8 billion) and Egypt (\$20.4 billion). In many African countries remittances are the most important and stable source of capital inflows, in some cases largely exceeding FDI and Overseas Development Assistance. In short, the diaspora is Africa's biggest single 'donor', to use the language of the development industry.

Migrants and diasporas send remittances for a variety of motives using different mechanisms. Occasionally remittances are generated by coercive means, when home governments impose demands for remittances. In so far as migration decisions are often part of an explicit or implicit contract between the migrant and the remaining household, migrant remittances are part of enlightened self-interest. Diasporas send them to improve consumption levels of family members, in anticipation of reciprocal assistance, as part of co-insurance arrangements, or to repay loans and investments in their human capital. Whatever the source, diaspora remittances increasingly play a crucial role in sustaining livelihoods, basic services, and economic growth in many developing countries. Financial transfers occur through formal channels - Western Union, Money Gram, banks. African diaspora are fighting for a reduction in the high costs of sending remittances and even tax relief for the senders of remittances. They also occur through the informal sector and other informal means.

The diaspora can also serve as a major philanthropic player in its own right or in helping to mobilise philanthropy in the hostland for their homeland. Diaspora philanthropy organisations are particularly important for subsequent diaspora generations who may not enjoy direct family and social connections in the homeland that first generation diasporans tend to. Thus while the latter dominate in remittance flows, the historic diasporas and later diaspora generations may gravitate to diaspora philanthropy to channel their capital,

skills, and services to the “homeland.”

For many African countries, their overseas diasporas constitute one of the largest sources of human capital for development. Africa suffers from the world’s highest rates of skilled labour emigration. Homeland governments and international development agencies have increasingly come to value the potential of the diaspora communities and expertise for development. The deployment of diaspora human capital often involves repatriation, which can be permanent, temporary, or circulatory in nature. Diaspora circulation often includes what some call “homeland tourism” and return visits. One can also think of the mobilisation of this capital in both physical and virtual modes.

Diaspora economic outlays to the homeland sometimes go beyond remittances, philanthropy, or repatriation. It can involve various levels and forms of business investments as well. Diasporas often possess deep affective capital for their homelands, their commitment tends to be long-term, they are more likely than other investors to think out of the box, and they can harness long-term contacts in the homeland. Diaspora investment decisions are based on expectations of financial, emotional, and social-status returns. Thus, diasporas exhibit strong country-of-origin-bias and a sense of origin-country-duty, derive ‘psychic income’ from investing in the homeland, and raise their status in the diaspora by doing so. Diaspora investments can range from purchasing equity or lending to local businesses to direct investments in industry and services. Diasporas can also serve as reputational intermediaries and provide transnational linkages for businesses in the hostland and homeland.

The impact of diaspora contributions is neither uniformly positive nor negative, but often variable depending on the specific context. The inflows of remittances, philanthropy and human capital from the diaspora are inherently contradictory. Remittances are insufficient to compensate for the losses of human capital from Africa in the first place. Their benefits are selective, they carry with them social and cultural baggage. They can increase dependency, engender economic distortions, deepen social and regional inequalities, which may hinder development because they are unpredictable, undependable and encourage the consumption of goods with high import content.

Diasporas do not control how their resources might be used in the homeland, such as being channelled towards conflict. Diaspora philanthropy and repatriation of human capital may have some of the same potentially negative effects. Diaspora attitudes and attitudes towards them may introduce new or reinforce old class stratifications, resentments, and divisions. Returning diasporans sometimes exhibit insufferable superiority complexes and project a development aid mentality which is deeply resented. Also, elites and even ordinary people in the homeland harbour their own complexes and resentments against the diasporans for abandoning the homeland when it was in crisis. These may erupt once the diasporans return. Such friction and hostility can exact a toll on development efforts by delaying or thwarting them altogether.

Assessing Africa's Growth

Undoubtedly Africa has made striking economic strides since the 2000s. But serious challenges remain, especially in three crucial areas - first, in terms of translating economic growth into decent job opportunities; second, in improving service delivery; and third, in reducing social and spatial inequalities. Many African governments have failed to convert the wealth created by economic growth into opportunities to build better lives and futures for all their people.

Thus the glaring mismatch between economic growth and inclusive development persists. It can be blamed on many factors, including the inability to unleash what some call the green and blue revolutions of agriculture and fishing; incapacity to cope effectively with the effects of climate change; underdeveloped domestic financial systems; pervasive corruption and the damaging consequences of plunder by foreign interests; exceedingly low rates of Africa's global value chain reflecting the continent's limited industrialisation and excessive dependence on natural resources and export of raw materials; being held back by low domestic capacity in terms of skills, productive capacity, poor infrastructure, and unfavourable business environments.

Growth does not by itself, as we learned from development studies in the 1970s, turn into development. The most decisive drivers for Africa's long-term development will include, in the short-term, increasing intra-African trade and raising the global value chains of African industrial and service sectors. It will also require the construction of democratic developmental states. In the long term, it is imperative for Africa to establish integrated, inclusive, and innovative societies and states without which African countries will not realise their full potential, as they will continue to pay the heavy economic costs of suboptimal growth, the political price of inequality-generated conflicts, and the deficits of creative and entrepreneurial inertia. This is one reason why the creation of robust and transformative higher education systems is an historical imperative.

Transformations in Higher Education

Higher education systems around the world, including Africa, are undergoing profound transformations as a result of massive internal and external disruptions. Five major sets of changes can be identified, namely, growth of massification, privatisation, internationalisation, shifts in knowledge production, and rising pressures for accountability. The way these forces manifest themselves of course vary within and among world regions and countries. As the old models of higher education of the past vanish, questions are increasingly being raised about the value and future of higher education. Moments of transition and crisis offer opportunities to rethink the future of higher education by reaffirming its enduring values while simultaneously recreating it through experimentation and innovation in the mission, values, purposes, structures, governance, and products of higher education institutions.

Massification

One of the most spectacular developments in the higher education landscape in recent decades is evident in the explosion in the number of higher education institutions and tertiary enrolments. The number of universities in the world

increased from 6,931 in 1970 to 18,808 in 2015. The fastest growth was registered in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. For Africa the number of higher education institutions rose from 170 to 1639 during the same period.

As for tertiary enrolments, the increase was from 32.6 million in 1970 to 198.6 million in 2013. Once again, the fastest growth occurred in the global South; for Africa it jumped from 0.74 million to 12.2 million, for Asia from 7.3 million to 108.2 million, and South America from 1.2 million to 18.0 million, while for Europe it was from 13.3 million to 31.5 million and North America from 9.8 million to 27.0 million. By 2013, enrolment ratios in Africa had risen to 12.08%, but still lagged behind the world average of 32.88%.

The factors behind this massive growth of higher education institutions and enrolment varied in their combination in different regions and countries. Generally, they included decolonisation, population growth, urbanisation, development, and demands from women and other disadvantaged groups for access to the social, cultural, and political capitals and opportunities promised by higher education. Decolonisation and population growth were particularly important in many countries of the Global South including Africa. In the main the colonial powers were not interested in providing higher education to their colonial subjects. In 1960, often regarded as the year of African independence in homage to the 17 countries that received their independence that year, there were only 57 universities in the whole of Africa; the majority of countries did not have a single university.

Currently, the impact of demographic pressures varies in different regions of the world. Many countries in the Global North are facing demographic decline so that institutional supply is increasingly outstripping student demand. In contrast, parts of the Global South, especially Africa, are experiencing rapid population growth resulting in student demand overwhelming institutional supply.

Privatisation

The second major trend in global and African higher education centres on privatisation. This is evident in the explosion of private universities, privatisation of public universities, and the growth of the for-profit higher education sector—historically private institutions were largely non-profit. The proportion of private universities worldwide grew from 40.60% in 1969 to 57.47% in 2015. In Africa private universities now outnumber public universities -: 972 to 667. The factors behind the privatisation craze include, first, escalating student demand and the incapacity of public institutions to meet it; and second, declining state support for public higher education arising out of financial constraints and the imperatives of neo-liberal ideology that has been globally dominant since the turn of the 1980s.

As higher education institutions have become less dependent on public funding, they are forced to cultivate new revenue streams, including “cost sharing,” soliciting private donor support, and marketing institutional services. As economic rather than educational outcomes have assumed greater salience, “credentialism” and “consumerist” expectations have risen among students. Privatisation has also forced curricula realignments to address market demands and what is often termed skills mismatch and the employability of graduates.

The privatisation of higher education has resulted in the growth of some fields and decline of others. Business and information technology programmes tend to dominate private institutions both non-profit and for-profit. In the more comprehensive and prestigious institutions the resources and status tend to flow disproportionately to the STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) disciplines at the expense of funding and the position of the humanities and to a smaller extent the social sciences.

Knowledge Reorganisation

In addition to the changes in the demographics and economics of higher education institutions, vast changes are taking place in the organisation of knowledge production. This was evident in the expansion and emergence

of new disciplines, sub-disciplines, and inter-, trans-, and multi-disciplinary fields of study from environmental studies to ‘big science’, which led to shifts in the positioning and status of different academic fields both inside and outside the academy.

There were also shifts in global knowledge hegemonies and hierarchies. First, the dominance of Global North has been declining while it has been rising for the emerging economies. North America’s share of global research and development declined from 37.9% in 1994 to 28.9% in 2013, while Europe’s fell from 31.4% to 22.7%. In the meantime, it rose for Asia from 26.6% to 42.2%, and to much smaller extent for Latin America and the Caribbean from 1.9% to 3.5%, and for Africa from 0.9% to 1.3%, respectively. Moreover, the proportions of the developed countries in the growth and distribution of researchers and publications also fell relative to the emerging economies, especially China. The latter more than doubled its share of world publications from 9.9 % in 2008 to 20.2 % in 2014. Asia as a whole raised its share from 24.2% in 2002 to 39.5% in 2014, while Africa managed an increase from a mere 1.6% to 2.6% during the same period. For North America the decline was from 34.2% to 28.6%, and for Europe 45.5% to 39.3%.

Further changes occurred in the modes of scholarly knowledge production, dissemination and consumption, facilitated by the rise of new information and communication technologies. Technology-enhanced learning has brought new pedagogical opportunities and challenges. E-learning programs range from various forms of blended or hybrid courses, which facilitate flipped classrooms, to online education. The disruptive potential of the new ICTs reached frenzy over Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) in the early 2010s. While the hype appears to have died down, the new digital technologies are not only changing the processes of teaching and learning, they are restructuring and reinforcement class, gender, and inter-generational divides and inequalities in higher education within and among disciplines, institutions, and countries.

Also undergoing profound transformations are the role of libraries and the dynamics of scholarly publishing. Libraries are moving from silent repositories of information into vibrant nerve centres for digitised information

communication; necessitating the provision information and digital literacy for students. Changes in academic publishing are emerging from the acceleration, commercialisation, and digitisation of scholarly communication. Academic impact assessments are no longer confined to the use of citation indexes as altmetrics emerge involving social media measures and data mining tools.

The academic profession and academic work are facing disruptions as well. This is manifest in four major ways. First, there are shifts in the relative influence among the state, academic professionals, and market models of governance marked by a progressive shift towards more top- down institutional governance. Second, the edicts of managerialism are increasingly undermining academic autonomy and freedom. Third, both academics and academic work are also becoming more fragmented due to the institutional, professional, and instructional unbundling of faculty roles.

Finally, the academic workforce is also becoming more casualised and stratified as institutions seek to cut costs by reducing the number of permanent faculty and expand the ranks of part-time faculty (also called adjunct or contingent faculty). In the United States the latter constitute more than 75% of the professoriate, a reversal of the ratio of tenured and contingent faculty in the early 1970s. In many African countries, teaching is dominated by adjuncts, who are often full-time faculty in one institution moonlighting in multiple institutions. The effects on lowering the quality of student learning are predictable.

Internationalisation

Internationalisation has emerged as one of the defining features of 21st higher education, engendering new modes, rationales, and practices of collaboration, competition, comparison, and commercialisation. The proponents of internationalisation trumpet its economic, political, social, cultural, and academic benefits. Also crucial is the consuming drive among a growing number of institutions for international recognition and branding. One measure of the internationalisation of higher education is the international

flow of students. The number of outbound tertiary students rose from 1,822,331 in 2000 to 3,546,552 in 2013. Asia raised its share from 43.39% to 55.45%, while Europe's share fell from 31.51% to 24.21%, and North America from 7.1% to 5.29% during the same period. The respective shares of Africa and South America also fell, from 13.12% to 10.53% and 3.67% to 3.60%, respectively. But North America and Western Europe increased their dominance as destinations for international students, as their collective share rose from 72.59% in 2000 to 74.26% in 2013.

Another growing aspect of internationalisation is evident in the export of institutional models from the Global North, which reinforces old historical patterns, to the Global South. Particularly influential has been the spread of the U.S. model through the establishment of American-style institutions, adoption of U.S.-centred academic cultures, and performance of U.S.-institutional identities. It has been facilitated by the creation of U.S. institutions abroad, development of outposts, satellites or branches of U.S. universities, provision of accreditation for institutions in other countries by U.S. accrediting agencies, and the growing popularity of international partnerships for and with U.S. institutions.

Some scholars see the development of education hubs that offer a critical mass of local and international educational providers, which is particularly popular in parts of Asia, as representing a new form - the third generation - of organising and internationalising higher education in the 21st century. According to this formulation, the first generation involved the mobility of people, primarily students, who went for full degree or short-term study and research. The second generation was characterised by the movement of programmes and providers that comprised the creation of twinning or franchised, articulated/validated, joint/double awards; online/distance programmes; or the formation of branch campuses and independent institutions.

Other emerging features of internationalisation include the importance increasingly accorded to the complementarity of internationalisation at home and internationalisation abroad. Moreover, transnational research and

scholarly collaborations have also grown. Bibliometric studies show that publications with authors from multiple countries have far higher rates of citation than domestic or single-country ones. The percentage of co-authored articles doubled between the early 1970s and early 1990s. The share of co-authored science and engineering articles worldwide increased from 8% in 1988 to 23% in 2009. The rate was even higher for the world's major science and technology regions where in 2009 it ranged from 27% to 42%.

But international research collaboration reproduces the uneven patterns of access to education and knowledge production evident in domestic settings. More often than not, for academics in the Global South the flow of international collaboration is vertical towards the Global North rather than horizontal in enhanced intra-regional or South-South engagements. Africa boasts the highest rates of international collaborations. Of the 54 countries, 47 had rates of more than 70%, including 30 with more than 90%, as compared to the OECD average of 29.4% and the G20 average of 24.6% between 2008 and 2014. This underscores the high levels of dependence of African academics on their counterparts especially in Western Europe and North America.

Clearly, competition for talented students, top faculty, scarce resources, and reputational capital has intensified, sanctified and mediated by global rankings. The race for rankings reflects the globalisation and the transformation of higher education into a strategic knowledge-intensive industry for the knowledge economy and society. Rankings serve to establish hegemonic norms of excellence to influence, incentivise, and change institutional behaviour, which enables the production and reproduction of surveillance, performance, and conformity. Also, rankings reflect and reinforce inter-institutional competition in an endless 'reputational' and 'positional' race that was unwinnable for all but the already top tier global institutions. Thus, they help to reinscribe the hierarchies between elite and ordinary institutions in the era of mass education, which is deemed critical by the elite institutions themselves and the ruling and cosmopolitan classes they primarily serve.

Accountability

As the costs and need for competitiveness among higher education institutions increase, demands have grown for accountability from all the affected constituencies - from students and parents to governments and employers. Concerns about the value proposition of higher education tend to find expression in the quality assurance and accountability movements. It is no longer enough for universities to brag about inputs; now they are expected to demonstrate value through outputs, including learning outcomes, retention, graduation and placement rates, and employability.

Employability is particularly critical. It encompasses the acquisition of knowledge and skills (job- specific and generic work skills), development of personal qualities and values (e.g., reliability and time management), and social networks. A recent report on *Universities, Employability and Inclusive Development: Repositioning Higher Education in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa* makes for sobering reading.¹⁹ It notes that African media is full of stories of the difficulties of graduates finding suitable employment and employers finding suitable graduates. It reports that the Inter-University Council of East Africa estimates “over half of all graduates are inadequately prepared for employment.”

The accountability movement also manifests itself in rising student protests for access, equity, and affordability. There has been a resurgence of student activism around the world: in Europe from Britain following the increase of tuition from £3290 to £9000 in 2010, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Belgium, Switzerland, Ukraine and Albania; in North America in Canada, the US and Mexico; in Asia in the Philippines, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Bangladesh; in North Africa during the Arab Spring; in the rest of Africa in Senegal, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and most dramatically in 2015 and 2016, the massive “FeesMustFall” movement in South Africa.

The demands and pressures for accountability have led to the development of national, regional, and global quality assurance and regulatory regimes

in many countries especially since the 1990s, for both public and private institutions.

Conclusion: Revitalising Higher Education for Africa's Development

Based on the analysis above, the two books from which much of the analysis is drawn, the Framing Paper that I wrote for the 1st African Higher Education Summit held in Dakar, March 2015, and the summit's Declaration and Action Plan,²⁰ I see the following priorities as critical for African higher education to promote the development project.

The first imperative is revitalising the commitment of the various stakeholders to expand higher education, including raising enrolments to global averages while making concomitant investments in academic staff, infrastructure, and facilities by the state, the private sector, society at large, and higher education institutions themselves to ensure and raise quality.

Second, promoting the diversification, differentiation, and harmonisation of higher education systems at the national, institutional and regional/continental levels.

Third, increasing higher education investments at institutional, national and international levels to facilitate development, promote stability, enhance access and equity, and develop, recruit and retain excellent academic staff and ensure high levels of institutional performance.

Fourth, pursuing excellence in teaching and learning, research and scholarship, public service and provision of solutions to the development challenges and opportunities facing African peoples across the continent.

Fifth, building capacity in research, science, technology, and innovation by developing and designating select universities as research universities that drive the higher education sector and are globally competitive.

Sixth, strengthening linkages between academia, business, and government to overcome the skills mismatch and improve the production of graduates who

are employable and who can drive the continent forward.

Seventh, ensuring that higher education is at the centre of nation-building processes and nurturing of democratic citizenship by deepening the culture of good governance, democratic values, gender equality, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law as enshrined in the relevant sections of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, 1981 and in the AU's Agenda 2063.

Eighth, promoting productive and empowering forms of internationalisation that facilitate the Africanisation of global knowledges and globalisation of African knowledges and include the mobilisation of the Diaspora in the revitalisation of the pan-Africanist project for the 21st century.

In short, it is imperative that the various key constituencies in African higher education from government, the general public, parents, to students, faculty, staff, and administrators in the academic institutions themselves raise the value proposition of African higher education. This requires commitment to what I call the 4As, 4Cs, 4Is, and 4Rs.

The 4As refer to availability (of institutions), access (to institutions), affordability (in institutions), and accountability (by institutions).

The 4Cs include comprehensiveness (provision of education that develops the whole person); curiosity (cultivation of lifelong learning); community (fostering civic values); and capabilities (developing soft skills and attributes beyond technical, job specific, and generic cognitive skills, especially communication and critical thinking skills, problem solving, empathy, creativity, self-confidence, and intercultural, international, interdisciplinary and information literacies).

The 4Is entail inclusion (valuing institutional diversity—class, gender, ethnicity, religion, disability, etc.); innovation (cultivating creative and entrepreneurial mind-sets); integration (building cohesive teaching, learning and research communities); and impact (fostering inclusive cultures of institutional assessment).

The 4Rs denote relevance (of knowledges produced, disseminated, and consumed to and by the economy, society, and the times - entails sustaining the project of decolonising knowledge from the historic epistemic stranglehold of Eurocentricism); retention (ensuring student completion, faculty and staff professional development and success); research (unwavering commitment to critical and basic knowledge production and evidence-based decision-making); and rigour (in all activities to ensure academic, operational and service excellence).

Only then will our universities contribute meaningfully to the ‘Africa rising’ narrative, turning it from a momentary rhetoric reflecting the fortunes of the few into a lasting reality for the well-being of the many. Higher education is a powerful engine for the construction of inclusive, integrated, innovative and sustainable democratic developmental states and societies. It is indispensable for fulfilling the dreams of generations of struggles against imperial and neo-colonial exploitation and marginalisation and realising our peoples’ enduring aspirations for emancipation and advancement. With that the continent may finally realise Kwame Nkrumah’s vision - expressed prematurely at the height of decolonisation - that the late 20th century would be Africa’s, and turn the 21st century into one that is truly ours.

ENDNOTES

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The Nyerere Dialogue Lecture series is one of two major publication activities of the Nyerere Resource Centre (NRC), the other being the Occasional Papers. Paul Zeleza's lecture, titled Higher Education and Africa's Development Agenda was delivered in September 2016. It traces the development of higher education in its various dimensions in Africa and globally, articulating the major concern of most educationists - the commercialisation, vocationalisation, disarticulation and direct or indirect privatisation of higher education, particularly university education.

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